CVE-2026-62374 json
SD JWT JS: Tampered disclosures silently dropped instead of rejected
published 2026-10-29 10 d ago modified 2026-11-04 5 d ago also GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 , EUVD-2026-113215
- cvss
- 7.1
- version 4.0, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.2%
- EPSS 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 13%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
SD JWT JS is a JavaScript implementation of the Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) specification. In version 0.19.0 and earlier, `@sd-jwt/decode`, also used by `@sd-jwt/core`, silently drops a tampered Disclosure whose digest no longer matches the Issuer-signed `_sd` array and returns a reduced claim set, reporting success while the Issuer signature remains valid. Both a tampered Disclosure that remains valid JSON and a Disclosure containing invalid UTF-8 bytes reach this silent-drop behavior. In the latter case, the `TextDecoder / Buffer` decoding path substitutes U+FFFD replacement characters, recovering syntactically valid disclosure data instead of rejecting the malformed input. This violates RFC 9901 section 7.1 step 5, which requires rejection of unreferenced Disclosures, and section 7.1 step 3 / section 4.2.1, which require rejection of invalid Disclosures. A malicious holder can exploit this omission primitive, including through `SDJwtInstance.verify()` when key binding is required. An on-path attacker can also tamper with a Disclosure when the relying party does not enforce key binding; enforced key binding rejects on-path tampering because it invalidates the KB-JWT `sd_hash` binding. If the relying party defaults to allowing access when a constraining age, role, or restriction claim is absent, the silent claim reduction can change an authorization decision without an error. This issue is fixed in `@sd-jwt/core` version 0.20.0; no patched version of the standalone `@sd-jwt/decode` package is identified.
Patch / fix
- npm @sd-jwt/core 0.20.0
Vendor advisories
What the vendors themselves say about their products: affected, fixed or not affected, and what to do.
red hat product security vex CVE-2026-62374 updated cvss 6.5
@sd-jwt/core: @sd-jwt/decode: SD JWT JS: Authorization bypass via silent omission of tampered disclosures
-
Red Hat All currently supported Red Hat productsnot affected: vulnerable code not present
Red Hat CSAF VEX © Red Hat, Inc., from https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/; changed: reduced to product statuses and remediations. CC BY 4.0 · csaf
CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- Proof of concept is public
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
- Assessed
- 5 d ago
Exploit prediction
0.23% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 13% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).
Exploits and checks
- github.com https://github.com/openwallet-foundation/sd-jwt-js/security/advisories/GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 4.0 | 7.1 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| CNA | 4.0 | 7.1 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @sd-jwt/decode | <=0.19.0 |
no fix listed |
| npm | @sd-jwt/core | <0.20.0 |
0.20.0 |
Affected products
- openwallet-foundation @sd-jwt/core
- openwallet-foundation @sd-jwt/decode
Classification
References
-
github.com
/openwallet-foundation/sd-jwt-js/pull/380
web
-
github.com
/openwallet-foundation/sd-jwt-js/commit/3d8a72a0a279d67439db038c9c2b52621568b866
web
-
github.com
/openwallet-foundation/sd-jwt-js/security/advisories/GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6
exploit, web
-
nvd.nist.gov
/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62374
advisory
-
github.com
/openwallet-foundation/sd-jwt-js
package
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-62374
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-f9j6-8p6x-r9j6
- NVD CVE-2026-62374
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