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Fencer Vulns
high 8.8

CVE-2026-90000 json

HID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports

published 2026-09-16 54 d ago modified 2026-10-19 21 d ago also EUVD-2026-80608

cvss
8.8
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.4%
EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 29%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports

The hid-rmi driver sizes its writeReport/readReport buffer purely from the report descriptor supplied by the device, with no minimum bound:

data->input_report_size = hid_report_len(input_report); data->output_report_size = hid_report_len(output_report); alloc_size = data->output_report_size + data->input_report_size; data->writeReport = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); data->readReport = data->writeReport + data->output_report_size;

but then reads and writes fixed offsets into it. A device declaring a 1-byte output and a 1-byte input report makes hid_report_len() return 2 for each, so alloc_size is 4, while rmi_set_page() -- reached unconditionally at probe time through rmi_input_configured() -- stores writeReport[4] and rmi_hid_read_block() stores writeReport[0..5]. Since readReport lives at writeReport + output_report_size, those stores also corrupt the window the next reply is parsed out of.

The read path is worse: the copy length comes from readReport[1], which the device fills in and can be up to 255, and the copy starts at &readReport[2] with no regard for input_report_size, so it runs past the end of the allocation into adjacent slab objects. This does not even need a lying device -- rmi_f01_probe() issues a fixed 21-byte register read, so any device declaring an input report smaller than 23 bytes reads out of bounds even when it answers truthfully. Those bytes become the register values the RMI core acts on: rmi_f01_probe() prints them to the kernel log as the product id and exports them through the mode 0444 sysfs attribute of the same name, and rmi_driver_set_irq_bits() sends them back to the device as the interrupt mask, so an undersized report descriptor leaks heap contents both to unprivileged userspace and to the device itself.

The write path has no bound either: rmi_hid_write_block() copies an unbounded len to &writeReport[4], and the largest caller a device can drive at probe time is rmi_driver_set_irq_bits(), whose length is derived from the interrupt source counts the device declares in its Page Description Table.

Finally, the read loop cannot terminate on a zero-length reply: such a reply copies nothing and advances neither bytes_read nor bytes_needed, and because a reply did arrive the one second wait_event_timeout() does not fire either, so a device answering 0 forever keeps the loop running inside the probe worker with page_mutex held. khungtaskd does not notice, because every reply wakes the task.

Reject reports too small for what the driver builds -- 6 output bytes for the write reports and 3 input bytes for the read handshake -- at probe time, clamp the write and the read copy to the report sizes the device declared, and treat a zero-length reply as an error. A device refused this way is started as an ordinary HID device, like one that does not carry the RMI report ids at all.

RMI_DEVICE must not be left set in device_flags on that path, because rmi_input_configured() would then run the RMI setup and reach rmi_set_page(), which writes the writeReport buffer the refusal just skipped allocating. The bit can arrive set: rmi_probe() copies id->driver_data into device_flags before the report checks, and a bind through the new_id sysfs attribute can supply driver_data with RMI_DEVICE (BIT(0)) set. Strip the bit where driver_data is copied, so RMI_DEVICE keeps meaning exactly "this probe validated the reports"; the three jumps to start that predate this patch are covered as well.

The error path also clears RMI_READ_DATA_PENDING on its way out, because that flag is what the wait at the top of the loop tests: leaving it set would make every later wait_event_timeout() return immediately on the stale reply and kill the read path for the rest of the device's life.

Clamping does not regress working hardware: the read loop already handles ---truncated---

Patch / fix

  • Linux Linux 5.10.270, 5.15.221, 6.1.188, 6.6.157, 6.12.110, 6.18.51, 7.2.5, 7.3
  • linux Debian 12 6.1.190-1
  • linux Debian 13 6.12.111-1
  • linux Debian 14 7.2.6-1
  • linux-6.12 Debian 12 6.12.111-1~deb12u1

debian advisories DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90000

  • linux Ubuntu 22.04 LTS 5.15.0-202.212
  • linux Ubuntu 26.04 LTS 7.0.0-42.42
  • linux-aws Ubuntu 22.04 LTS 5.15.0-1119.126
  • linux-aws Ubuntu 26.04 LTS 7.0.0-1016.17
  • linux-gcp Ubuntu 22.04 LTS 5.15.0-1120.130
  • linux-gcp Ubuntu 26.04 LTS 7.0.0-1016.18
  • linux-gke Ubuntu 22.04 LTS 5.15.0-1115.121
  • linux-ibm Ubuntu 22.04 LTS 5.15.0-1113.117

ubuntu advisories UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90000

Ubuntu security data © Canonical Ltd., from https://github.com/canonical/ubuntu-security-notices via OSV; changed: normalised to fixed package versions per release. CC BY-SA 4.0

  • kernel-source Linux Micro 6.0 6.4.0-159998.55.1
  • kernel-default Linux Micro 6.0 6.4.0-159998.55.1
  • kernel-kvmsmall Linux Micro 6.0 6.4.0-159998.55.1
  • kernel-default-base Linux Micro 6.0 6.4.0-159998.55.1.159998.21.42
  • kernel-64kb SLE Module for Basesystem 15 SP7 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1
  • kernel-syms SLE Module for Development Tools 15 SP7 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1
  • kernel-azure SLE Module for Public Cloud 15 SP7 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1
  • kernel-source SLE Module for Development Tools 15 SP7, SLE Module for Basesystem 15 SP7 6.4.0-150700.53.90.1

suse advisories SUSE-SU-2026:24550-1SUSE-SU-2026:5091-1

  • kernel-source openSUSE Tumbleweed 7.2.7-1.1

opensuse advisories openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1

  • kernel Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.157.1-1

azure linux advisories AZL-101123

Azure Linux vulnerability data, Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation, from https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData via OSV, under the MIT licence; changed: normalised to fixed package versions per release. MIT

Vendor advisories

What the vendors themselves say about their products: affected, fixed or not affected, and what to do.

red hat product security vex CVE-2026-90000 updated cvss 8.0

kernel: HID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports

  • Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 perf, kernel, bpftool, kernel-rt, python-perf, kernel-kdump, +8 more Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 perf, kernel, bpftool, kernel-rt, kernel-core, kernel-tools, +29 more Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 rv, perf, rtla, kernel, bpftool, libperf, +83 more Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 kernel Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8, openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9 Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9
    affected: workaround, no fix available
  • Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 perf, kernel, python-perf, kernel-kdump, kernel-firmware, kernel-bootwrapper, +1 more
    not affected: vulnerable code not present

Red Hat CSAF VEX © Red Hat, Inc., from https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/; changed: reduced to product statuses and remediations. CC BY 4.0 · csaf

Exploit prediction

0.35% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 29% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 8.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected products

  • Linux Linux

Classification

Technology feeds

References

Sources

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