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Fencer Vulns
high 8.6

CVE-2026-77581 json

BentoPDF: SSRF in cors-proxy-worker.js via DNS-based hostname allowlist bypass

published 2026-09-24 46 d ago modified 2026-09-29 40 d ago also EUVD-2026-86229

cvss
8.6
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.3%
EPSS 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 18%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

BentoPDF is a client-side PDF toolkit that is self hostable. In 2.8.6 and earlier, the certificate and timestamp CORS proxy in cloudflare/cors-proxy-worker.js uses isPrivateOrReservedHost() to validate a supplied hostname separately from the DNS resolution used by fetch(targetUrl), allowing an attacker-controlled hostname to resolve to an internal or reserved destination after validation. A certificate-like path can satisfy ALLOWED_PATH_PATTERNS, and direct clients can forge the browser-oriented Origin header. Deployments without PROXY_SECRET skip the optional signature check, while the signature is an anti-abuse measure rather than a destination-security boundary. The proxy has a 10 MB response limit and can relay response bodies from reachable destinations. The advisory identifies both the official Worker deployment and self-hosted instances as impacted where the Worker execution environment can reach internal or reserved destinations. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.7.

Patch / fix

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
46 d ago

Exploit prediction

0.27% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 18% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/alam00000/bentopdf/security/advisories/GHSA-5xjf-rr5x-pcfj referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 8.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

Affected products

  • alam00000 bentopdf

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery

References

Sources

Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.