MobSF: SSRF port restriction bypass in assetlinks_check

published 2026-08-18 2 mo ago modified 2026-10-22 17 d ago also EUVD-2026-61133 , GHSA-95px-34x5-p37h , PYSEC-2026-3690

cvss: 3.0; version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev: Not listed; not in CISA's catalog
epss: 0.3%; EPSS 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 26%
public exploits: 0; none known

MobSF is a mobile application security testing tool used. Prior to 4.5.1, get_browsable_activities in mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/manifest_analysis.py validates only an Android manifest android:host value with valid_host before appending a separately supplied android:port to the URL fetched by _check_url, allowing an authenticated user to upload a crafted APK that makes requests to an attacker-selected nonstandard port at /.well-known/assetlinks.json. With an attacker-controlled hostname and DNS rebinding between validation and the requests.get connection, the request can reach an internal service, although redirects remain disabled and the path is fixed. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.1.

Patch / fix

fixed in 2 links 3

pypi mobsf 4.5.1
opensecurity mobile_security_framework 4.5.1

CISA SSVC

Exploitation: Proof of concept is public
Automatable: no
Technical impact: partial
Assessed: 2 mo ago (2026-08-18)

Exploit prediction

0.33% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 26% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

Exploits and checks

github.com https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-95px-34x5-p37h referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by	version	score	vector
CNA	3.1	3.0	CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
GitHub	3.1	3.0	CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
OSV	3.1	3.0	CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem	package	affected	fixed in
pypi	mobsf	<4.5.1	4.5.1

Affected products

MobSF Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF

Classification

Weakness

CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery

References

Sources

Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.

Summary