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Fencer Vulns
critical 9.3

CVE-2026-48797 json

Backpropagate: backprop ui --auth and backprop ui --share do not enforce authentication

published 2026-06-16 4 mo ago modified 2026-10-27 12 d ago also GHSA-f65r-h4g3-3h9h , PYSEC-2026-291 , EUVD-2026-37516

cvss
9.3
version 4.0, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.3%
EPSS 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 25%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

Backpropagate is a Python library for fine-tuning large language models on a single GPU. In versions 1.1.0 and 1.1.1, the optional Reflex web UI exposes a training control plane without authentication: dataset upload, model load, training start/stop, multi-run orchestration, GGUF export, and HuggingFace Hub push. The CLI accepts two operator-facing flags intended as security controls: --auth user:pass — documented as "require HTTP Basic authentication on every request to the UI." and--share — documented as "expose the UI on a public address; requires --auth." When --auth user:pass is passed, the CLI prints Auth: enabled (user: <username>) to confirm to the operator that authentication is active, then exports BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH=user:pass to the subprocess that launches the Reflex backend. The Reflex backend (backpropagate/ui_app/**) never reads BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH. No authentication middleware is registered. No request-level guard runs. No WebSocket upgrade guard runs. Any client that reaches the bound port — local or remote, depending on whether --share is used — has full UI access. An inline comment at backpropagate/cli.py:1217-1218 in the v1.1.0 source documents the gap: "For Phase 1 the variable is exported but Reflex doesn't read it yet." This comment was internal-facing; the user-facing documentation (README, CHANGELOG, SHIP_GATE) advertised the contract as enforced. An attacker who reaches the bound port can read uploaded datasets, trigger arbitrary training runs against any local base models as well as read their paths, trigger HuggingFace Hub pushes and cause disk-fill DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0. If developers cannot immediately upgrade to 1.2.0 run backprop ui with no flags so it binds to localhost, use SSH port-forwarding (ssh -L 7860:localhost:7860 <training-host>) instead of --share for remote access, and audit any host previously launched with --share, re-issuing any HF tokens used during those sessions.

Patch / fix

  • pypi backpropagate 1.2.0
  • npm @mcptoolshop/backpropagate 1.2.0

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total
Assessed
4 mo ago

Exploit prediction

0.32% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 25% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 4.0 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CNA 4.0 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
pypi backpropagate
>=1.1.0, <1.2.0
1.2.0
npm @mcptoolshop/backpropagate
>=1.1.0, <1.2.0
1.2.0

Affected products

  • mcp-tool-shop-org backpropagate
  • mcp-tool-shop-org @mcptoolshop/backpropagate

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-358 Improperly Implemented Security Check for Standard
  • CWE-862 Missing Authorization
  • CWE-1295 Debug Messages Revealing Unnecessary Information

References

Sources

Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.