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Fencer Vulns
critical 10.0

CVE-2026-48772 json

ProxySQL: PROXY-Protocol-v1 UNKNOWN parses spoofed source IP, bypassing mysql_query_rules.client_addr ACL

published 2026-06-19 4 mo ago modified 2026-10-25 14 d ago also BIT-proxysql-2026-48772 , EUVD-2026-38074 , GHSA-gw94-85m2-x8v2

cvss
10.0
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.2%
EPSS 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 13%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

ProxySQL is a proxy for MySQL and its forks, as well as PostgreSQL. In versions 2.0.0 through 3.0.8, the ProxySQL MySQL frontend accepts the `PROXY UNKNOWN <addr> <addr> <port> <port>\r\n` PP1 frame as a well-formed PROXY protocol header. The HAProxy PROXY protocol v1 specification says that when the protocol token is `UNKNOWN`, the receiver MUST ignore any address fields that follow it, because the proxy has declared it cannot determine the client identity. ProxySQL parses those address fields anyway via `sscanf` and writes the spoofed source address into the session's `addr.addr` field. From there it flows directly into the query-rule matcher, where the `client_addr` predicate decides routing and ACL. When `mysql-proxy_protocol_networks = '*'` (the default), any TCP peer can send a PP1 frame and choose any source IP claim. With that, any `mysql_query_rules` row pinned to a `client_addr` value is forgeable: the attacker writes the address they want to match into the PP1 line, and ProxySQL routes their query as if it came from that address. In practice this is a routing and ACL bypass. Real deployments use `client_addr` for read-write splitting (internal apps go to the primary, public traffic to read replicas), per-app schema pinning, and query-filter rules (DDL allowed only from admin CIDR, public queries blocked from dangerous patterns). An attacker that can reach the frontend port can forge their way into any of those routes. Version 3.0.9 patches this issue.

Patch / fix

  • bitnami proxysql 3.0.9
  • proxysql proxysql 3.0.9

Vendor advisories

What the vendors themselves say about their products: affected, fixed or not affected, and what to do.

red hat product security vex CVE-2026-48772 updated cvss 10.0

proxysql: ProxySQL: Routing and Access Control List bypass via spoofed PROXY protocol header

  • Red Hat All currently supported Red Hat products
    not affected: vulnerable code not present

Red Hat CSAF VEX © Red Hat, Inc., from https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/; changed: reduced to product statuses and remediations. CC BY 4.0 · csaf

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
4 mo ago

Exploit prediction

0.23% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 13% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/sysown/proxysql/security/advisories/GHSA-gw94-85m2-x8v2 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
OSV 3.1 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
bitnami proxysql
>=2.0.0, <3.0.9
3.0.9

Affected products

  • sysown proxysql

Classification

Weakness

References

Sources

Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.