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Fencer Vulns
high 8.0

CVE-2026-48080 json

OpenReception's tenant detail endpoint discloses live PostgreSQL connection string, superuser-scoped in the tested official deployment

published 2026-08-06 3 mo ago modified 2026-10-23 16 d ago also EUVD-2026-54217

cvss
8.0
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.5%
EPSS 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 40%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the `GET /api/tenants/{id}` endpoint returns the full tenant record to any authenticated `TENANT_ADMIN` of that tenant, including the `databaseUrl` field. This field contains the live PostgreSQL connection string the application uses to connect to that tenant's database. In the tested official `docker-compose.prod.yml` deployment, the connection string contained the user `postgres` with `rolsuper=true` and the plaintext password from `secrets/postgres_password.txt`. Operators who configure a non-superuser PostgreSQL user via `secrets/postgres_user.txt` would expose a less privileged credential, but the disclosure of the connection string itself is independent of that choice. The same credential applies to every database managed by that PostgreSQL instance: the central `appointment_booking` database, every per-tenant database (one per tenant), and the postgres administrative database. A `TENANT_ADMIN` of one tenant who can reach `postgres:5432` (directly via internal network, indirectly via any SSRF, RCE, or file-read in the application) can read every other tenant's appointment ciphertexts, key shares, and metadata; read the central user table, including all `GLOBAL_ADMIN` accounts, password hashes, and session records; modify or delete any data in any tenant database; and/or i a superuser-scoped deployment: use PostgreSQL's `pg_read_server_files`, `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`, and `CREATE EXTENSION` for further escalation inside the database container. This breaks the per-tenant database isolation that is otherwise the primary cross-tenant control in the application. The application code carefully scopes most queries to the calling tenant's database, but those scopings are irrelevant once the attacker holds the credentials that bypass the application entirely. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.

Patch / fix

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total
Assessed
3 mo ago

Exploit prediction

0.47% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 40% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-v7fw-6xpm-7gj9 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 8.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected products

  • open-reception appointment-booking-software

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

References

Sources

Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.