CVE-2026-46555 json
WhatsApp MCP: Unauthenticated bridge API allows message sending and arbitrary file exfiltration
published 2026-07-20 3 mo ago modified 2026-10-24 15 d ago also EUVD-2026-46037
- cvss
- 7.7
- version 3.1, CNA
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- 0.2%
- EPSS 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 10%
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `/api/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, "local caller" extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched — sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user's session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images / release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a configured directory, with rejection of absolute paths outside the root and path traversal sequences. This is a breaking change for clients of the bridge API. For users who cannot immediately upgrade: Stop the bridge, or block loopback access to port 8080, when the bridge is not actively in use; avoid running the bridge alongside untrusted MCP servers, browser extensions, or other untrusted local processes; avoid browsing untrusted sites while the bridge is running (DNS rebinding mitigation); and/or run the bridge under a dedicated user account or in a sandbox/container with no access to sensitive files.
Patch / fix
- verygoodplugins whatsapp_mcp_server 0.2.1
CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
- Assessed
- 3 mo ago
Exploit prediction
0.21% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 10% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).
CVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | 3.1 | 7.7 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
| NVD | 3.1 | 7.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
Affected products
- verygoodplugins whatsapp-mcp
Classification
References
-
github.com
/verygoodplugins/whatsapp-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-7jj9-4qqq-4xc4
mitigation, patch, vendor-advisory
-
github.com
/verygoodplugins/whatsapp-mcp/blob/main/SECURITY.md
issue-tracking
-
github.com
/verygoodplugins/whatsapp-mcp/releases/tag/v0.2.1
product, release-notes
Sources
- CVE List CVE-2026-46555
- NVD CVE-2026-46555
Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.