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Fencer Vulns
medium 5.3

CVE-2026-24889 json

soroban-sdk has overflow in Bytes::slice, Vec::slice, GenRange::gen_range for u64

published 2026-01-28 9 mo ago modified 2026-06-17 4 mo ago also EUVD-2026-4848 , GHSA-96xm-fv9w-pf3f

cvss
5.3
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.4%
EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 32%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

soroban-sdk is a Rust SDK for Soroban contracts. Arithmetic overflow can be triggered in the `Bytes::slice`, `Vec::slice`, and `Prng::gen_range` (for `u64`) methods in the `soroban-sdk` in versions up to and including `25.0.1`, `23.5.1`, and `25.0.2`. Contracts that pass user-controlled or computed range bounds to `Bytes::slice`, `Vec::slice`, or `Prng::gen_range` may silently operate on incorrect data ranges or generate random numbers from an unintended range, potentially resulting in corrupted contract state. Note that the best practice when using the `soroban-sdk` and building Soroban contracts is to always enable `overflow-checks = true`. The `stellar contract init` tool that prepares the boiler plate for a Soroban contract, as well as all examples and docs, encourage the use of configuring `overflow-checks = true` on `release` profiles so that these arithmetic operations fail rather than silently wrap. Contracts are only impacted if they use `overflow-checks = false` either explicitly or implicitly. It is anticipated the majority of contracts could not be impacted because the best practice encouraged by tooling is to enable `overflow-checks`. The fix available in `25.0.1`, `23.5.1`, and `25.0.2` replaces bare arithmetic with `checked_add` / `checked_sub`, ensuring overflow traps regardless of the `overflow-checks` profile setting. As a workaround, contract workspaces can be configured with a profile available in the GitHub Securtity Advisory to enable overflow checks on the arithmetic operations. This is the best practice when developing Soroban contracts, and the default if using the contract boilerplate generated using `stellar contract init`. Alternatively, contracts can validate range bounds before passing them to `slice` or `gen_range` to ensure the conversions cannot overflow.

Patch / fix

  • crates.io soroban-sdk 22.0.9, 23.5.1, 25.0.2
  • stellar rs-soroban-sdk 22.0.9, 23.5.1, 25.0.2

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
partial
Assessed
9 mo ago

Exploit prediction

0.38% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 32% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
GitHub 3.1 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
crates.io soroban-sdk
>=25.0.0, <25.0.2
>=23.0.0, <23.5.1
<22.0.9
25.0.2
23.5.1
22.0.9

Affected products

  • stellar rs-soroban-sdk

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound

References

Sources

Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.