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Fencer Vulns
high 8.8

CVE-2026-14535 json

Fickling MLAllowlist analysis pass rendered inoperative by shared mutable state in AnalysisContext.shorten_code()

published 2026-07-04 4 mo ago modified 2026-10-25 14 d ago also GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429 , PYSEC-2026-2150 , EUVD-2026-41676

cvss
8.8
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.6%
EPSS 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 47%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.

Patch / fix

  • pypi fickling 0.1.12
  • trailofbits fickling 0.1.12

Vendor advisories

What the vendors themselves say about their products: affected, fixed or not affected, and what to do.

red hat product security vex CVE-2026-14535 updated cvss 8.8

fickling: Fickling: Arbitrary code execution via pickle deserialization bypass

  • Red Hat Exploit Intelligence exploit-intelligence-tech-preview/vulnerability-analysis-rhel9
    affected: workaround, no fix available

Red Hat CSAF VEX © Red Hat, Inc., from https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/; changed: reduced to product statuses and remediations. CC BY 4.0 · csaf

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
Proof of concept is public
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total
Assessed
4 mo ago

Exploit prediction

0.56% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 47% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

Exploits and checks

  • github.com https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429 referenced PoC, tagged "exploit" by a source, unverified

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 8.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
NVD 3.1 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
OSV 3.1 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
pypi fickling
<0.1.12
0.1.12

Affected products

  • trailofbits fickling

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure

References

Sources

Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.