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Fencer Vulns
critical 9.8

CVE-2026-14245 json

miniOrange OTP Login, Verification and SMS Notifications <= 5.5.1 - Authentication Bypass to Administrator Account Takeover via 'username_b' Parameter

published 2026-07-09 4 mo ago modified 2026-07-09 4 mo ago also EUVD-2026-42543

cvss
9.8
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
1.1%
EPSS 1.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 65%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

The miniOrange OTP Login, Verification and SMS Notifications plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Administrator Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.5.1. This is due to the `um_reset_password_process_hook()` function performing no server-side verification that the OTP validation step was completed, and relying solely on a public `form_nonce` nonce that the plugin itself emits to unauthenticated visitors via the `moumprvar` JavaScript object on the Ultimate Member password reset page, while still accepting the attacker-controlled `username_b` parameter to target any WordPress user without role restriction or any binding to a previously validated OTP session. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to obtain a freshly generated password-reset URL for an arbitrary Administrator account — returned in a 302 `Location` header — and use it to take full control of that account. Exploitation requires the Ultimate Member Password Reset Form integration to be active and the plugin to not be configured for phone-only reset.

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
total
Assessed
4 mo ago

Exploit prediction

1.07% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 65% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected products

  • cyberlord92 miniOrange OTP Login, Verification and SMS Notifications

Classification

Weakness
Technology feeds

References

Sources

Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.