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Fencer Vulns
high 8.7

CVE-2026-105299 json

Pingora forwards client-nominated Connection headers to HTTP/1 upstreams, allowing ACL bypass in specific chained deployments

published 2026-10-20 20 d ago modified 2026-10-26 14 d ago also EUVD-2026-104781 , GHSA-vx4q-2c55-cvmg , RUSTSEC-2026-0390

cvss
8.7
version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
0.4%
EPSS 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 37%
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

Summary

Before version 0.9.0, the HTTP/1 upstream path in pingora-proxy passed the downstream request through upstream_request_filter and wrote it to the upstream without removing the client's Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in upstream_request_filter (for example, Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin.

Impact

Specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go's net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. The reporter demonstrated access to an IP-restricted endpoint using X-Forwarded-For for IP validation on the origin. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server.

Note that Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as no such chained deployment as described above exists with internal Pingora services, and Connection headers are sanitized before arriving at Pingora gateways.

Mitigation:

*

Upgrade to pingora 0.9.0 or later. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto, or a pseudo-header. This is controlled by PeerOptions::http_upstream_request_policy (HttpUpstreamRequestPolicy). Fix commits: https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded , https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee

*

Do not use HttpUpstreamRequestPolicy::preserve() if the origin relies on headers added by Pingora; it restores the old passthrough behavior.

*

If you cannot upgrade: in upstream_request_filter, remove the Connection header and every header it nominates before adding trusted headers.

Patch / fix

  • crates.io pingora-proxy 0.9.0
  • Cloudflare https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora 0.9.0

CISA SSVC

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total
Assessed
19 d ago

Exploit prediction

0.43% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 37% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
CNA 3.1 8.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
crates.io pingora-proxy
>=0.0.0-0, <0.9.0
0.9.0

Affected products

  • Cloudflare https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests

References

Sources

Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

CPEs and fixed versions use Anchore's correction of NVD's data: Added CPE configurations because not yet analyzed by NVD.