Client connections using default TLS certificates from OpenEdge may bypass TLS host name validation

published 2024-09-03 2 y ago modified 2026-06-17 4 mo ago also EUVD-2024-48284

cvss: 7.2; version 3.1, CNA
cisa kev: Not listed; not in CISA's catalog
epss: 0.2%; EPSS 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days, percentile 5%
public exploits: 0; none known

Host name validation for TLS certificates is bypassed when the installed OpenEdge default certificates are used to perform the TLS handshake for a networked connection. This has been corrected so that default certificates are no longer capable of overriding host name validation and will need to be replaced where full TLS certificate validation is needed for network security. The existing certificates should be replaced with CA-signed certificates from a recognized certificate authority that contain the necessary information to support host name validation.

Patch / fix

fixed in 1

Progress OpenEdge 12.8.0

CISA SSVC

Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical impact: partial
Assessed: 2 y ago (2024-09-03)

Exploit prediction

0.16% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, higher than 5% of all scored CVEs (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-08).

CVSS scores

assigned by	version	score	vector
CNA	3.1	7.2	CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
NVD	3.1	4.8	CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Affected products

Progress OpenEdge

Classification

Weakness

CWE-297 Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch
CWE-287 Improper Authentication

References

community.progress.com /s/article/Client-connections-using-default-TLS-certificates-from-OpenEdge-may-bypass-TLS-host-name-validation
vendor-advisory, mitigation

Sources

CVE List CVE-2024-7346
NVD CVE-2024-7346

Fencer Vulns keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

Summary